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## Thinking through scale: the role of state governance in globalizing North Pacific fisheries

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**Abstract.** Debates about the relationship between globalization and state power have often relied on a static view of spatial scales as discrete stages for social interaction. Focusing instead on the ‘production of scale’, several researchers have argued that globalization leads to rescaling of the state, as regulatory powers are realigned both upwards to supranational regimes and downwards to regional, local, and urban governance structures. Although this perspective quite usefully treats scale as relational, this ‘glocalization’ argument remains somewhat schematic and does not allow for a full range of possible scalar configurations. Highlighting instead heterogeneity of scalar relations, in this paper I analyze the ways that United States’ fishery development in the North Pacific produced both national power and transnational economic activity. After extending political jurisdiction over waters up to 200 nautical miles from shore, the United States implemented fishery development policies that emphasized the ‘Americanization’ of the Alaska pollock fishery at the expense of an international, particularly Japanese, fishery. The outcomes of these policies, however, have been international partnerships, foreign direct investment, and increased international trade, all of which have made the pollock industry simultaneously national and transnational. Efforts to assert and implement control over ocean territory produced both the national state and globalization, which were mutually reinforcing rather than antagonistic. Treating national states and the global economy as complex, contingent scalar configurations facilitates analysis of the causes of variability in state–economy relations.

### Introduction

At the same time that increasingly global economic integration seems to challenge the regulatory power of states, the world’s oceans have come under increasing state control. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, concluded in 1982, codified claims by individual states over waters to 200 nautical miles from the coastline. Once protected as a global commons under the rubric of ‘freedom of the high seas’, much of the world ocean is now a part of state territory. That this process of enclosure should occur during this era of globalization appears at first glance to be contradictory. However, it is possible to explore the ways in which extended jurisdiction and processes of globalization in the oceans are mutually integrated. The process of extending state control into the oceans was in part spurred by global economic activities such as distant-water fishing. Further, after extended jurisdiction, many states have played an active role in integrating resources from their Exclusive Economic Zone into global networks of fish production, trade, and consumption. In this paper, I examine this interplay between state and global processes during the era of extended jurisdiction by analyzing changing scalar relations involving the North Pacific Ocean. Recognizing that “state intervention helps to *constitute* the spatial structure of the economy, and that spatial structure in turn influences the state’s economic policy actions and their outcomes” (Martin and Sunley, 1997, page 278), I address how the changing territorial configuration of the oceans has constrained and enabled fishing activities in the North Pacific since the 1970s.

I focus on the North Pacific fishery for Alaska pollock (*Theragra chalcogramma*), which is the largest fishery in the world (FAO, annual). The portion of the fishery carried

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out in United States' waters comprises the largest fishery in the United States: from 1990 to 1997, US fishing fleets annually caught an average of 1.4 million metric tonnes of pollock, with the 1997 catch worth US \$250 million (Grieg et al, 1998).<sup>(1)</sup> Pollock is also an important commodity in seafood trade, with pollock products constituting the largest individual category of seafood export from the United States (NMFS, 2000). Pollock are found in coastal waters from Southern Canada around the North Pacific to Japan, with the highest concentrations in the Bering Sea, in waters that are now controlled by the United States and Russia. The majority of the pollock catch is processed either into breaded and battered fish products or into *surimi*, a fish paste that is used to make analog seafood products such as 'krab' legs. Although American and European consumption of *surimi* seafood has increased dramatically since the 1970s, *surimi* is mainly consumed in Japan, where it was first developed several centuries ago and is still widely used in a variety of seafood products. Japanese fishing fleets, using new technologies designed to process *surimi* onboard fishing vessels, started the pollock fishery in the 1950s. By the 1970s there was some international trade in pollock, and countries such as the Soviet Union and Korea had entered the fishery, but the majority of the catch was for Japanese domestic *surimi* production. Although this fishery was carried out in what was then part of the global ocean commons, this was mainly a domestic industry: fleets of Japanese-flagged vessels owned by Japanese firms caught pollock to produce traditional Japanese seafood products and market them to Japanese consumers.

Over the next twenty years the pollock fishery was completely transformed as US domestic fishing entirely displaced all other fishing fleets by 1990. Although the success of the US fishery after the 1970s is fundamentally tied to the development of national control over ocean territory, this fishery also depends on global forms of fish production and investment. As policymakers and fishing industry members transformed the North Pacific from a space of overlapping domestic use in the global commons into a region divided into separate national territories, they also constituted it as a region based upon economic integration across national borders.

This case demonstrates that there is a complex relationship between global economic activity and national states. Against views that the global and the national are necessarily antagonistic, a variety of researchers have recently emphasized that globalization and state power are not locked into a zero-sum game in which the dominance of one necessarily leads to the diminution of the other (see, for example, Amin and Thrift, 1997; Dicken et al, 1997; Held et al, 1999; Martin and Sunley, 1997; O'Neill, 1997). Rather, it is important to analyze how intertwined processes of economic and political activity both produce and depend upon scalar configurations. In the next section, I explore how thinking about the production of scale can expand the discussion about relationships between states and globalization, and I focus both on the promise and on the shortcomings of recent theoretical perspectives. In subsequent sections I show that, as the USA took over the pollock fishery in order to assert control over the North Pacific, policymakers, fishers, and processors made it into a global industry, characterized by international partnerships, foreign direct investment, and increased international trade. Although constituting this regional fishery as a national industry, a range of actors from the USA, Japan, and other Asian and European countries have actively produced new scalar configurations of the state and globalization.

<sup>(1)</sup> In this paper I address only the portion of the North Pacific that is now part of the United States. All catch and trade statistics are exclusively for the US portion (or, for statistics from before 1977, what would become the US portion) of this larger region.

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### Thinking through scales

In recent years, there has been new theoretical attention paid to the ways in which scale itself is produced through ongoing sociospatial practices (Beauregard, 1995; Brenner, 1997; 1998a; 1998b; 1999a; 1999b; Cox, 1998; Delaney and Leitner, 1997; Jonas, 1994; Massey, 1994; Smith, 1992; 1993; Swyngedouw, 1992; 1997a; 1997b). Arguing against a view of scales as ontologically given, these authors posit that the production of scale is a highly dynamic process through which power relationships become spatialized: scales are not things, but historical processes manifest in space. Further, scale is not simply a byproduct of social processes, but scales play a vital role in shaping what Massey calls “geometries of power” (1994). This politics of scale highlights “unevenness in the penetration of area forms” as unevenness is produced through complex assemblages of sociospatial practices (Cox, 1998, page 2). And as Marston (2000) emphasizes, these sociospatial practices are not limited to the political–economic realm, but necessarily include a variety of social and cultural processes as well. Central to this argument is that scales are not fixed, but are instead fluid and contested; rather than treating scales as separate objects that act on each other, we should give attention to how intertwined, interwoven scales are “produced as temporary standoffs in a perpetual transformative sociospatial power struggle” (Swyngedouw, 1997b, page 141). Because “it is precisely the active social connectedness of scales that is vital” (Smith, 1993, page 101), “the theoretical and political priority... never resides in a particular geographical scale, but rather in the process through which particular scales become (re)constituted” (Swyngedouw, 1997a, page 169).

This theoretical perspective is particularly useful for exploring relationships between state governance and global economic activities because it explicitly challenges either/or, zero-sum conceptions of spatial scales, such as those offered in the opposing perspectives of Ohmae (1995) and Hirst and Thompson (1999). In either/or conceptions, globalization is defined precisely as the erosion of state control, so that, if states retain their power, globalization is then simply a myth (see also Beck, 2000; Boyer and Drache, 1996; Scott, 1997). The production of scale perspective offers an alternative view, in which globalization is not necessarily about shifts in power between two a priori scales (the national and the global), nor about the relations between already given scales. Rather, it is about the ways that political power and economic relations continually rework and remake interconnected scaler configurations. Whereas the state, in particular, is often conceived of as a given structure or ‘totalized entity’, the production-of-scale perspective resonates more with a view of “the state as a domain where a complex and heterogeneous state apparatus is in constant interplay with non-state institutions and agents” (O’Neill, 1997, page 290). In the North Pacific, then, the issue is not about the ways that an already given state apparatus affects or is affected by a global fishing industry, but instead it is about how specific events and practices continually produce national state territoriality and power while simultaneously producing global economic activity.

A number of scholars have begun to address the relationship between governance and globalization in specifically scalar terms (such as Jessop, 1999; 2000; Kelly, 1999; MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999). In this paper, I focus in particular on the work of Swyngedouw (1997a; 1997b) and Brenner (1997; 1998a; 1998b; 1999a; 1999b), because it is they who have most extensively developed arguments about the changing status of the nation-state in terms of the production of scale. Arguing that globalization does not simply erode the state, but rather leads to the ‘rescaling’ of the state, both Swyngedouw and Brenner examine the ways that scale is produced during periods of capitalist restructuring. As capital has reorganized production on a global scale, the role of the nation-state is transformed because consumption and reproduction remain

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nationally regulated. This leads to ‘glocal’ shifts as regulatory powers of the state are realigned both upwards to supranational regimes and downwards to regional, local, and urban governance structures. To think about the state in these scalar terms, Brenner makes a distinction between *forms* (such as cities, states) and *scales* (the urban, regional, national, global) of territorial organization, so that scales become the scaffolding upon which exist various forms of territorial organization (1998a, page 464). Changes over the past three decades represent a historical moment of scalar restructuring as the relationship between accumulation and regulation rapidly change, and the current restructuring is of the production of the scales at which the state operates, rather than the erosion of the state.

Although both Brenner and Swyngedouw argue quite convincingly that the rise of globalization need not lead automatically to the decline of the state, in their analyses neither author allows for much variety in how scale is produced in specific situations. As I show below, though each develops a somewhat different argument, they both theorize the production of scale within a schematic view of capitalist relations, thus undermining their theoretical elaboration of scale by once again making it a thing, albeit contested. These authors very usefully treat scale as historically contingent but they then generalize new scalar relations across the globe, thereby denying the range of possible scalar configurations arising within processes of globalization. In particular, their ‘glocalization’ thesis presents the nation-state as a stable scalar structure (produced in the past), that is currently being altered by global capital, rather than as a continually contested, changing, and produced scalar configuration. This stable nation-state is then being eroded across the globe in response to processes of globalization. This generalized argument is particularly problematic for exploring the ways that extended state jurisdiction in the oceans, and the new forms of economic activity in these spaces, involved scalar processes that contributed to producing state power and territoriality. In what follows, I briefly outline each author’s argument, and then discuss some of the shortcomings of their claims about the production of scale in the contemporary period.

Brenner locates his argument in the logics of capital accumulation, focusing on how scalar configurations are remade during periods of crisis in capitalism as capital searches for a new ‘scalar fix’. Linking the production of scale to dynamics of deterritorialization and reterritorialization (1998a), Brenner’s basic argument is that “the tension between fixity and motion in the circulation of capital has periodically triggered major transformations in the scalar organization of the territorial state” (page 472). He locates changes in the scalar organization of the state in the changing territorial arrangements demanded by the logic of capital accumulation: as capital strives to annihilate time with space, the state will by necessity shift the scales at which it operates, in the process creating a new scalar scaffolding upon which capital accumulation can continue. Arguing that it is important to “specify the determinate spatial scale to which each historical-geographical configuration of capitalist development corresponds” (1997, page 276), Brenner then derives a periodization of scalar fixes associated with capitalist restructuring over the past century (1998a).

Swyngedouw, like Brenner, locates the production of scale fundamentally in the circulation of capital and the “accumulation imperative” (1997b, page 156), but focuses more on the role of conflict and compromise in sustaining capitalism. It is through scale that there is a balance between cooperation and competition: scale is a “temporary sociospatial compromise that contains and channels conflict” (1997b, page 146). The production of scale is viewed as of a piece with the social relations undergirding capitalism, such that intercapitalist competition, capital–labor struggles, and monetary exchange are organized through, and then produce, specific scalar arrangements.

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The state, and the form of the state, is produced as one of the sociospatial compromises that leads to a certain amount of stability: because the state plays a central role in the mode of regulation, shifts in the regime of accumulation will necessarily alter the form and scalings of the state. From this perspective, Swyngedouw argues that recently there has been “a profound shake-up of established geographical scales, their content and their relations with other scales” (1997a, page 170). As capital has produced new scalar configurations upon which to organize accumulation, the state has been rescaled in its role in regulating capital–labor relations and economic development. This represents not a diminishing role of the state apparatus, but rather a new role that reflects the era of ‘glocalization’.

Although the rescaling argument seems to highlight the relational nature of scale, the specific approaches Brenner and Swyngedouw bring to analyzing capitalist relations, combined with their scalar narratives, tend unintentionally to reify scale. Although they each emphasize the contingent nature of scale, define scale as a social process, and see scale as something that is continually being remade, their tendency is to make scale into something that is periodically fixed, only to be remade during times of capitalist crisis, that is, as made-stable–remade through time. Although they state that scale is a result, an outcome, of dynamic sociospatial processes, and is therefore perpetually redefined, both authors argue that the current era is one in which established scales are being shaken up, and new scales are yet to be established (see also Jessop, 1999; 2000). Thus, both authors present “fixing scales” (Brenner, 1998a, page 468) as a “temporal compromise” (Swyngedouw, 1997b, page 147) central to the continuation of capitalism. Although this view does present scale as conflictual and precarious, it does not challenge the idea that scales are fixed as things, nor that they act as containers. Furthermore, although arguing that the state is changeable over time, this view treats the state as fixed and given during periods of stability.

There are at least three reasons for these authors’ tendency to shift back into talking about fixed scales, despite their theoretical positions that scale is processual. First, their historical argument is highly generalized. Relying on a schematic view of how capitalism works, they collapse variability into a single, global story about the scalar fixes required for continued capital accumulation and regulation and how states have developed in concert with these fixes. By developing a periodization of global capitalism, they leave room for only one story about the relationship between ‘the state’ and ‘capital’, though the story might change over time, it is invariant over space and across sectors. This type of periodization of capitalism has been criticized by Goodman and Watts (1994) and Page (1996), who use their analyses of agricultural transitions to argue against collapsing variability into a single story of capitalist development and corresponding modes of regulation. Because Brenner and Swyngedouw rely on a schematic periodization, there is no room in the story for the heterogeneity and conflict that underlie these authors’ theoretical approach to the production of scale.

Second, by telling a general and deterministic story, Brenner and Swyngedouw elide all real actors from their analysis, thus tending to make the economy, capital, or even capitalism itself the agent of change. Capital, in its search for a scalar fix to the contradiction between fixity and motion or in its desire to escape from regulation, jumps scales and forces the state to rescale as well. From these perspectives, capitalism might produce spatial difference (in the form of uneven development), but the process itself becomes relatively undifferentiated. These analyses ultimately, and unoriginally, ascribe causality to the global scale: working in the global arena, capital gains the power to erode the national state by requiring the state to jump scales. If these authors incorporated real actors into their analyses—individuals, firms, agencies, laws, conventions, etc—then they would have to account for a new type of unevenness and

variability (Beauregard, 1995). Taking seriously the perspective that globalization processes are always uneven and heterogeneous undermines the coherent story of semistable scalar fixes that both Swyngedouw and Brenner present.

Third, both Brenner and Swyngedouw use similar and problematic scalar metaphors that reflect the tensions between their stated goal of seeing scale as perpetually remade and their descriptions of scale as the outcome of the tensions of capitalism. Using metaphors such as “nested” and “arena”, they make scales into things, or stages, that contain actions. For example, although arguing that “scales are not merely the platforms” upon which capitalism occurs, Brenner argues that “each geographical scale represents a contested *arena in which* the spatiotemporal contradictions of the capital relation are continually reproduced and fought out” (1998a, pages 464–465, emphasis added). Swyngedouw writes of the “*nested* articulation of scale levels” (1997b, page 151, emphasis added), arguing that “the transformative continuation of sociospatial relations... produces a set of related and *nested* spatial scales which define *arenas* of struggle” (1997a, page 175, emphasis added). These metaphors—nested and arena—reify scales as mutually exclusive things that can rest inside one another, and between which it is possible to move or ‘jump’. This is a very different metaphor than one that evokes scale as process and relation, as produced through actions that are always already multiscaled.

The vision of nested scales is inadequate for thinking about the variety of scalar practices. For example, rather than fitting neatly inside each other, scales may be tangled, adjacent to one another, and overlapping (Jessop, 1999; 2000). They do not contain action, as Brenner and Swyngedouw argue so convincingly in their theoretical treatment, but are actively produced by and shape action. An alternative metaphor for scale is raised by Cox (1998), who tries to avoid areal metaphors by treating “jumping scales” not as moving between separate arenas, but as actively constructing expanded networks of association, thus emphasizing not the scale-as-thing but scale-as-relation. Focusing on the ways in which scales-as-relations overlap, rather than on nested scales-as-things, makes it possible to discuss global processes that occur within a place, bringing into view the ways in which regions might contain the global, for example, or how individuals can embody the state. This perspective resonates with Massey’s “global sense of place” (1994), and with Sassen’s arguments about “embedding the global in the national” in which she emphasizes that many events internal to nation-states should be cast as global processes (1999).


Starting from scales-as-relations, it is possible to highlight some of the ways in which states and the national are complicit in globalization, rather than assuming that they are the victim of globalization (for example, O’Neill, 1997; Ó Tuathail et al, 1998; Panitch, 1996). National states and national systems of governance have not disappeared, but shape and respond to economic activities in a variety of (shifting) ways (for example, Amin and Thrift, 1997; Dicken et al, 1997; Martin and Sunley, 1997; O’Neill, 1997; Ong, 1999; Weiss, 1999). It is not just a matter of states responding to economic processes, but that there are a variety of state–economy relationships; it then becomes important to analyze critically the range of relations to understand more precisely just what ‘globalization’ and ‘the state’ are and can be. By acknowledging heterogeneity, these perspectives on relationships between national states and global economic processes resonate with an approach to the production of scale that emphasizes ongoing, conflictual processes and perpetual (re)definitions.

Using this orientation to scalar practices, I analyse the creation of the pollock industry in the US portion of the North Pacific Ocean as the production of scale through a specific conjunction of political and economic maneuvering. In this analysis, I focus on the national state as continually contested and remade—for example, through

the decades-long negotiations over extended jurisdiction over ocean space—and relate this to processes of globalization. If states are more usefully conceptualized as social relations than as things (Jessop, 2000, page 349), then they are continually being produced, not just during periods of crisis, and the stability and fixity to which theorists allude is illusory. The work required to reproduce national state structures thus also reconfigures the national as a scalar relation. Further, that work may also contribute to the creation and maintenance of other, intertwined scales of interaction, such as the regional and the global. Analyzing state–economy relations in the North Pacific pollock fishery as a case of the active production of scale, highlights a very specific set of processes through which national and global scales are created and entwined.

### Extended jurisdiction: reconfiguring the national

Changes in the political-economic geography of the world's oceans, culminating in the 1970s to 1980s, initiated the transformation in pollock fishing in the North Pacific from a Japanese fishery, carried out in international waters, into a US-based fishery that is characterized by transnational integration. The USA declared a 200-mile<sup>(2)</sup> Fishery Conservation Zone in 1976, which was subsequently renamed the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in 1983 after the 200-mile zone had become customary international law. Extended jurisdiction by countries around the world enclosed about one third of the world's oceans, with the United States gaining the most ocean territory, including the majority of the North Pacific (Woodworth, 1994) (see figure 1). Coastal states have long had sovereign jurisdiction over a narrow 'territorial sea', but with the development of EEZs, states shifted markedly away from treating oceans as the "common heritage of mankind [sic]" (Pardo, 1967, number 1516, page 2) and toward treating them as domains of state and economic control. Although EEZs are controlled by a single state, the international law of the sea does not give states full, sovereign rights over the territory, but rather sovereign rights to control the resources of the zone [see Steinberg (1999) for a discussion of the tensions between freedom of the seas



**Figure 1.** Exclusive Economic Zone boundaries in the North Pacific Ocean, showing the 200-nautical-mile line. Boundaries based on Charney and Alexander (1993); Prescott (1985); and UN Office of Ocean Affairs (1992). Solid lines indicate boundary agreements; dashed lines, contested boundaries; no lines, no data.

<sup>(2)</sup> This zone is officially 200 nautical miles wide.

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and extended jurisdiction to enclose marine resources]. Despite these legal changes, however, simply declaring a 200-mile zone does not give each state de facto control over this new territory; rather, states have actively to develop their control over their ocean territories in a process marked by unevenness in the ability of individual states to do so. It is therefore important to make the distinction between state 'ownership' of the territory and active control of the territory through control over economic activities.

Thus, as the international community came to accept extended jurisdiction and to implement it actively, it was also actively involved in state building, a process I interpret as the production of scale. It is in this process of defining and producing state governance and national economic activity in the North Pacific that a variety of agents together produced new scalar relationships that link state control and globalization in the pollock industry. The rest of this section outlines the ways that the USA used extended jurisdiction and fishery policy to consolidate national control by enclosing ocean space as national rather than international territory. In doing so, it actively reconfigured not only the physical territory of the country, but also national state power. This highlights some of the sociospatial processes through which the national scale is continually produced, and through which the national has remained a significant scale of interaction in recent years. The following section will turn to the ways these processes have also produced new global scalar relations, so that the national and the global are intricately intertwined.

#### **Americanization**

In producing new scalar configurations of state territory and regulatory power, the USA expanded national control over their new ocean territory by launching a fishery development program designed to *Americanize* the new 200-mile zone by eliminating foreign fishing and replacing it with American fishing. In the 1976 legislation that established the 200-mile zone, Congress called for "a national program for the development of fisheries which are underutilized... by United States fishermen, including bottom fish [such as pollock] off Alaska" (FCMA, 1976, page 332). *Americanization*, however, was not instantaneous, and international fishing continued. Under the existing international law of the sea, states were obliged to use ocean resources to the greatest extent possible. As the US government interpreted international law, if an individual country had fish resources it could not or did not utilize domestically, it was to make them available to interests from other countries (US House, 1980a, pages 23–30; 1982a, pages 273–275). Thus, during the late 1970s, marine resources such as fish were a complex mix of international and national resources, and therefore the USA was unable simply to eliminate all foreign fishing by decree. To address this situation, the federal government set up a system by which the domestic fishing industry had first priority to the fish and the State Department apportioned any 'surplus' among all the eligible countries that applied to fish for that species. Japan, South Korea, Poland, the Soviet Union, Taiwan, and West Germany all had fishing agreements with the USA, first negotiated in 1977, and received allocations to fish in the North Pacific (Sproul and Queirolo, 1994). As members of the US Congress and State Department publicly stated, the US government used these international fishing agreements as a means to get explicit international recognition of US control over the 200-mile zone (US House, 1977; see also the following section). Thus Americanization was an ongoing process through which the USA attempted to transfer both marine territory and resources into the national domain by redefining ocean space in a state context. Extended jurisdiction and Americanization redefined the meaning of the state by producing new scalar relations of both territoriality and international relations.

However, these initial efforts to redefine state territoriality and control over ocean space by shifting scales of jurisdictional power did not lead directly to complete domestic control over the fisheries of the North Pacific. Despite extended jurisdiction and national policy to control international fishing in the US 200-mile zone, by 1980 there was still almost no domestic fishing for Alaska pollock. US industry members and policymakers feared that the well-established Japanese fishery could out-compete any US newcomers in the marketplace, thus making it impossible for a US fishery to develop. The Japanese industry had additional incentive to inhibit the growth of a US pollock fishery because if they did invest in or otherwise help the US industry, they would reduce their own allocation: as domestic catch went up, foreign fishing automatically went down. The US government responded to this situation with a specific set of policy measures designed to consolidate national control over the 200-mile zone by using international involvement in the fishery to develop a domestic pollock industry.

#### **US international fishery policy: fish and chips**

In 1980 the US government passed the American Fisheries Promotion Act to facilitate domestic fisheries development by altering the incentive structures facing international fishing interests (AFPA, 1980). The AFPA formulated specific criteria designed to compel countries that wanted to fish in the US 200-mile zone to assist with domestic fisheries development in return. The new criteria stated that allocations of fishing rights would be based on the extent to which either the government or the industry from that country contributed to US fishery development through measures such as reducing tariff and nontariff trade barriers, purchasing US fish, investing in the domestic industry, or transferring harvesting or processing technologies. By including these provisions, the US government tried to change the perception of foreign allocation from a *right*, based on maximizing the catch of every fish species, to a *privilege* that was tied to cooperation with the USA in its efforts to Americanize the fisheries of the 200-mile zone (US House, 1980a; 1982a; 1982b). Thus these 'fish and chips' criteria, as they came to be known, were also fundamentally about redefining the relationship between state control and ocean territory by defining access to fish resources as fundamentally the purview of the state, which could grant access or not depending on a range of factors. By developing and implementing these new criteria, the USA was actively shifting ocean territory and resources further out of the international arena and into the realm of national state control.

Even before passage of the AFPA in 1980, the US State Department, working with the Department of Commerce, had developed a nascent, but unsuccessful, fish and chips policy to attempt to reduce Japan's import barriers on pollock and other fish products (US House, 1980b). Japanese negotiators made several trade concessions at the Tokyo round of GATT (The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), concluded in 1979 (US House, 1987–88, page 20), but negotiators did not concede to the USA at all during trade meetings in 1980 at which the USA tried to speed up these tariff reductions and to ease import quota restrictions (US House, 1980a). Contesting the ways in which the USA was trying to define state control over oceans and ocean resources, the Japanese government did not agree with the USA that there should be any tie between their access to fishing in the 200-mile zone and the US fish industry's access to Japanese markets. To support their position, the Japanese government cited the bilateral fishing agreement between Japan and the USA, negotiated in 1977, which indicated that the USA would promote the objective of optimum utilization and minimize economic dislocation by taking into account past fishing practices by Japanese fleets (US Department of State, 1977, article V). Further, existing language did not explicitly allow for the USA to withhold fish on the basis of whether a country

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opened markets to US fish. Thus, the expanded fish and chips criteria, as written into the 1980 AFPA, marked a shift in which the US government significantly expanded the reach of national state control into ocean space.

The fish and chips criteria became the major lens through which the State Department, in conjunction with the Department of Commerce and the fishing industry, planned, negotiated, and implemented allocations for the international fishery. Yearly allocations for Japanese fishers, in particular, were determined through a two-tiered process, in which industry members from each country would negotiate over specific measures, after which government negotiators would meet to discuss compliance with individual guidelines and past commitments (NRC, 1985; 1986; US House, 1981; 1985). Further, for the USA to implement fish and chips effectively, the government had to make the bilateral fishing agreements reflect the same language that was written into the AFPA. When the original fishery agreements expired in 1982, the government designed a new model agreement that directly incorporated the language of the AFPA criteria (US House, 1982a). The USA saw the new fishery agreements as serving two main functions: obtaining foreign acknowledgement of the USA's right to control its EEZ, and getting these countries to state that they would assist the USA with Americanization (US House, 1982a). The model fishing agreement also eliminated the language of economic dislocation. This model was accepted by the major pollock-fishing countries (US Department of State, 1982a; 1982b; 1984), which represented a major win for the US government and its changing perspective on the scales of ocean governance.

Seen in terms of the production of scale, the fish and chips policy, the implementation of and negotiations over international fishing agreements, and negotiations with Japan over fishing allocations and fisheries development were all factors in producing new scalar configurations of territorial control and fishing activity. Both the national state apparatus and the regional fishery were actively produced rather than existing as given scalar entities. Further, these sociospatial practices have led not to a 'glocal rescaling' of the state away from the national scale, but instead toward a rearticulation of the national state. Not only national territory, but also national regulatory power was continually reasserted and redefined through this multifaceted program of Americanization through fisheries development. In the next section I turn to the ways in which these scalar processes were also involved in producing a transnational pollock industry in the North Pacific.

### **The outcomes of fish and chips: producing the global**

By their own accounts, various branches of the US government and industry describe the fish and chips policy as highly successful, especially for expanding domestic fishing capacity. For example, an official with the State Department argued that "allocation policy [provided] important leverage in promoting the utilization of U.S. fisheries resources by the U.S. industry", and that "allocation... was the primary tool by which... countries were encouraged to assist in the U.S. industry's development". He goes on to say this policy was "extremely successful" at developing US fishing capacity (Snead, 1989, pages 15–16). A Senate report similarly boasts that fish and chips "is a policy which has worked well for the U.S. industry" (US Senate, 1982, page 5). The Pacific Seafood Processors Association, an industry organization, stated that "most of the gains in the last ten years in increasing [domestic fishing] and reducing trade barriers [have] been through the fish and chips approach. This approach has enhanced our ability to gain greater access to our own resource and [has] managed to displace foreign effort especially in the harvesting sector" (US House, 1987–88, page 55). Finally, by 1988, Senator Murkowski from Alaska could claim that "the efforts of

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
this and previous Congresses to Americanize the fisheries of the US exclusive economic zone have... ripened into sweet victory for our own fishing industry, which is now capable of harvesting all, and processing nearly all, of our own resources" (US Senate, 1988, page 11). What is so interesting about this fish and chips success story, however, is what is not included in the discussion. The very same outcomes that mark Americanization as the successful implementation of national control over ocean space also denote globalization within the North Pacific fishery; the same practices that reconfigured the national state also produced a new global industry.

### **Joint ventures**

Growth of the domestic fishery for pollock was the first and most dramatic success of the fish and chips policy. Catch of pollock by US fishers rose from a negligible one thousand metric tonnes in 1980 to almost one million metric tonnes by 1986 (Kinoshita et al, 1995, page 23; MFR, 1987, page 62). However, the existence of this fishing activity was premised on a transnationally integrated industry that relied on nonequity joint-venture partnerships. Under these nonequity joint-venture agreements, US fishers sold their catch of pollock directly to international—mostly Japanese—processing vessels stationed within the 200-mile zone. As fishers were drawn to the opportunities that "Alaska's vast pollock resource" provided (AFDF, 1987, page II-1), they still faced the problem that there was no domestic processing industry, and so they had nowhere to sell the pollock once they caught them. Foreign processing vessels provided a key intermediate market in this initial stage of domestic fishing.

Initially, Japanese firms had little to gain by participating in these joint ventures, because any increase in US catch would reduce their own catch. However, the US government used the fish and chips framework to encourage foreign fleets to participate in joint ventures. The federal government recategorized joint-venture fishing by distinguishing it from both the domestic and the international fishery and assigning each category priority for access to the yearly total catch: first priority went to domestic fishing for domestic processing, second priority to domestic fishing for joint ventures, and third priority went to the international fishery (FCMA, 1978). The US government could thus deny all fishing to a country if firms refused to participate in joint ventures, and they could reward participation in joint ventures with a greater fishing allocation. According to the State Department, participation in these joint-venture operations became one of the primary allocation criteria throughout the early 1980s (Snead, 1989; US House, 1985; US Senate, 1985; see also US House, 1987–88). Joint-venture catch grew over eighteen-fold between 1981 and 1987 (the year with the highest joint-venture catch), and exceeded total catch in both the international and domestic industries from 1986 to 1988 (Kinoshita et al, 1995, page 23) (see figure 2, over). Joint-venture fishing was an intermediate form of operation, only in existence for a decade, but was a critical stage in that it allowed US fishers to enter the pollock fishery for the first time.

The joint venture fishery not only extended the domestic pollock fishery, it also represents the ways in which this domestic industry was integrated from the beginning into transnational production chains through international partnerships, and therefore how Americanization also contributed to global scalar practices. As an example, in one of the first joint-venture operations for pollock, US fishermen caught fish for Soviet processing vessels. The fish was taken to the Soviet Union, then transshipped aboard a Japanese freighter to South Korea, where it went through the initial processing stages. From there, the pollock was shipped back to the USA for final processing (NRC, 1981). This is the type of global production chain often used to characterize globalization: even though US consumers were eating fish sticks and other similar



**Figure 2.** Catch of Alaska pollock in the US Exclusive Economic Zone, 1970–97. By fishery sector: foreign, joint venture, or domestic (source: DOC, 1983; Kinoshita et al, 1992; NPFMC, 1998). Note: Catch for 1970–76 is from the area that would become the US 200-mile zone after 1976.

products that originated as fish in US waters, caught by US fishers, they were not domestic products. Thus, although joint ventures were an important step toward successfully Americanizing the 200-mile zone, they did not encourage development of a fully domestic industry. Until the mid-1980s, although the joint-venture fishery was thriving, there remained no US processing for pollock, either for the domestic or for the international market. Although fishing in the North Pacific was increasingly American, joint-venture fishing made the lines between a national and a transnational industry increasingly blurry.

### Foreign direct investment

Starting in the mid-1980s, fish and chips negotiations also contributed to a pollock processing sector. At industry talks in 1985, Japan's two largest seafood firms—Nippon Suisan and Taiyo (now Maruha)—agreed to invest \$10 million each to construct surimi plants in Alaska (NRC, 1986, appendix 3). These surimi plants—UniSea (then Greatland Seafoods) and Alyeska Seafoods—initiated the first 'domestic' surimi processing in 1985–86, along with a US factory trawler and a US plant that the Alaska Fisheries Development Foundation outfitted to produce surimi.

This initial Japanese foreign direct investment (FDI) in US surimi is both the direct and the indirect effect of the fish and chips criteria, as written into US law and the bilateral fishing agreements. It is a direct effect in that the USA used fishing rights as a lever to gain fishery development assistance, which is the basic strategy of fish and chips. More indirectly, however, the incentive structure facing Japanese fishing firms changed throughout the 1980s as a result of fish and chips achievements in joint-venture fishing. As joint-venture catch rose, international fishing interests faced the probability that joint-venture catch would rise to the extent that it would eliminate all foreign fishing, as it did by 1988 (Kinoshita et al, 1992, page 24). To maintain their access to fish such as pollock, firms such as Nippon Suisan and Taiyo/Maruha redefined their approach to the fish industry, not just in pollock, but as the core of their business. Investing in surimi processing plants in Alaska was part of a larger

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strategy on the part of these Japanese fish firms to shift their focus from fishing to processing, trade, and distribution (Stokke, 1991).

When Nippon Suisan and Taiyo/Maruha agreed to invest in the shore-based surimi processing sector, they started a pattern of foreign direct investment that remains dominant today, despite year-to-year changes in investment. In my discussion of current patterns of FDI, I have chosen to focus on the years 1996–98 because of data availability and because these years were relatively stable in terms of ownership. Several companies have changed hands or restructured since 1999, as a result of the 1998 American Fisheries Act (AFA, 1998), which was in part aimed at changing ownership patterns. Because this new regulatory environment is largely beyond the scope of this paper, I have tried to limit my discussion of ownership patterns to the several years prior to these changes. Unless otherwise noted, I have calculated all data on ownership structure, across sectors, from information provided in reports from the State of Alaska (Alaska Legislative Research Services, 1998) and the North Pacific Fishery Management Council (NPFMC, 1999).

Since the mid-1980s, Japanese firms have maintained a strong presence in the shore-based processing sector of the pollock industry. In 1998, of the eight shore-based processing plants active in the pollock industry, four were fully or partly owned by Japanese firms (see table 1, over). Fishing companies also became involved in the processing business by building factory trawlers that could replace the international fishing and processing fleet. This sector is composed of catcher–processors and of ‘motherships’, which are processing vessels that do not catch their own fish. Although this sector played a major role in eliminating all direct foreign fishing, and thus in Americanizing the fishery, FDI characterizes a substantial portion of this sector of the pollock industry: through the late 1990s, a mix of US, Korean, Japanese, and, mainly, Norwegian vessels constituted this sector, so that by 1998, twenty one of thirty two (66%) vessels were foreign owned (see table 1). In addition, many of these large processing firms, both onshore plants and at-sea processors, have vertically integrated to some extent by owning several fishing boats that provide their processing operations with pollock. Although the largest US-owned firms carried this out to the greatest extent, as of 1996, all of the large foreign firms also had active vessels: Maruha had eight, Nippon Suisan and Nichiro each two, Aker RGI one. Some 15% of all the fishing vessels (exclusive of catcher–processors) that participated in the 1996 pollock fishery had some foreign ownership; 30% of these were fully owned by foreign companies.

Japanese companies have also pioneered another form of economic integration in the pollock industry. As they were pushed out of fishing, many companies became transnational brokers and wholesalers of finished surimi seafood products. A large share of the US-caught fish from US territory sold in the USA is marketed through US-based firms which are subsidiaries of Japanese multinational corporations. Of the top ten US surimi seafood suppliers in 1996 (see *Seafood Business* 1997, page 30), six of them were subsidiaries of Japanese firms including Maruha, Nippon Suisan, and Nichiro, Japan’s top three fish firms (see table 1). Ownership structure for these secondary processors was derived from corporate reports and databases, as indexed in Lexis-Nexis (1999).

Thus, the result of producing new configurations of state territorial control is that foreign firms play an active role in the pollock industry. FDI in this industry, as encouraged by the fish and chips policy, contributed both to Americanization and to globalization of the North Pacific. As government officials and industry members (from the USA, Japan, and elsewhere) extended the national state into the oceans, they have also created new transnational relations within this region.

**Table 1.** Ownership structure of the Alaska pollock industry by sector, 1998.

Company	Foreign owner	Country of ownership	Number of plants/vessels
<i>Catcher – processor vessels and motherships</i> <sup>(a)</sup>			
Alaska Ocean	Nichirei Foods, Hoko Fishing, Alaska Ocean	Japan, USA	1
Alaska Trawl	Daerim Fishery Co.	South Korea	1
Aleutian Spray		USA	1
American Seafoods	Aker RGI	Norway	16
Arctic Fjord	Oyang (50%)	South Korea, USA	1
Arctic Storm		USA	1
Glacier Fish		USA	2
Peter Pan Seafoods	Nichiro	Japan	1
Phoenix Processor		USA	1
Supreme Alaska Seafoods	Maruha	Japan	1
Tyson Seafoods		USA	5
Yardarm Knot		USA	1
<i>Inshore processing plants</i>			
Alyeska Seafoods	Maruha (50%)	Japan, USA	1
Northern Victor		USA	1
Peter Pan Seafoods	Nichiro	Japan	1
Trident Seafoods		USA	2
Tyson Seafood Group		USA	1
UniSea Inc.	Nippon Suisan	Japan	1
Westward Seafoods	Maruha	Japan	1
<i>Top ten suppliers of surimi products</i> <sup>(b)</sup>			
Tyson Seafood Group		USA	
Trans-Ocean Products	Maruha	Japan	
Nichirei Foods America	Nichirei	Japan	
Icicle Seafoods		USA	
Kyotaru Oregon	Kyotaru	Japan	
Shining Ocean		USA	
UniSea Foods	Nippon Suisan	Japan	
Peter Pan Seafoods	Nichiro	Japan	
Sugiyo International	Sugiyo	Japan	
LM Foods		USA	

<sup>(a)</sup> Information on ownership of catcher–processors, motherships, and inshore processing plants from Alaska Legislative Research Service (1998) and NPFMC (1999). These sources conflict over ownership of the Alaska Ocean; I have used the more recent source.

<sup>(b)</sup> Suppliers to the US market, as of 1996. List of firms, in order of importance, from *SeaFood Business* (1997). Ownership patterns derived from Lexis-Nexis (1999).

### New trade regimes

At the same time that Japanese firms first agreed to build surimi plants in Alaska, they also agreed to buy small amounts of pollock products from US processors, in addition to their joint-venture purchases (1984 Memorandum of Discussions, published in NRC, 1985, appendix 4; see also US Senate, 1985). But the growth of a new trade dynamic was not about a simple internationalization in which separate and independent trading partners are involved in arm's length transactions. Rather, trade outcomes are intertwined with the shifts that happened in the industry through joint ventures and FDI, and are thus the outcomes of producing both national and global relations within the North Pacific.

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The main goal of the fish and chips policy had always been to increase US exports of nontraditional fish products, especially to Japan. According to one Senator who helped craft the policy, fish and chips was designed to create “an express link between improved access to foreign markets and allocation of our surplus fish to foreign fishermen” (US House, 1980b, page 2). Applying the policy to joint ventures or investment in processing plants was an “imaginative way” (US House, 1981, page 42) to expand the policy during its implementation, and was always seen as a step toward the basic aim of increasing US exports of these fish. Ultimately, the US goal was to sell Japan a product that it had once obtained for free. Although for almost a decade after the creation of the EEZ the USA continued to import pollock products for domestic consumption, the dramatic changes in trade statistics from the mid-1980s seem to indicate that US negotiators were eventually able to gain trade concessions from Japan. After US and Japanese industry members used the fish and chips framework to negotiate the first sales of US-processed surimi to Japan, US exports to Japan increased rapidly. By 1992, the USA exported almost 100 000 metric tonnes (over two hundred million pounds) of surimi to Japan, at a value of US\$330 million.<sup>(2)</sup> From 1992 to 1998, the USA exported to Japan a yearly average of over 100 000 metric tonnes of surimi worth \$260 million. Of the 150 individual categories of seafood product that the USA exports to Japan each year, surimi is now the single largest category; surimi exports to Japan, by weight, account for 23% of all US seafood exports to Japan and 12% of total seafood exports to all countries. Whereas Japan receives over 80% of US surimi exports, Korea is also a major market for US surimi, receiving an average of just over 10% of exports between 1992 and 1998. The remaining 10% of exports go to a variety of Western European and East and Southeast Asian countries, including France, Italy, Taiwan, Malaysia, and China.

Although surimi export from the USA to Japan has increased dramatically—from nothing to 12% of total US seafood exports in just five years—the process and results are not quite what the USA seemed to envision when the fish and chips policy was first developed, and the results do not represent a traditional pattern of simple trade between countries. The development of this new trade relationship is not based on the direct successes of the fish and chips policy, which aimed to create a relationship between separate, national trading partners. Instead, it is premised on the indirect effects of the policy, manifest in increased transnational integration in the North Pacific industry achieved by the mid-1980s.

Although Japan had been a net exporter of seafood products through the mid-1970s, the advent of extended jurisdiction worldwide limited overall access to fish by Japanese firms, such that Japan became the world’s largest fish importer. However, despite the fact that the overall seafood trade balance between Japan and the USA shifted in favor of the USA in 1981, until the mid-1980s the USA had a negative trade balance in pollock products with Japan: Japan was exporting pollock obtained from US waters back into the USA in the form of surimi products—over 30 thousand metric tonnes in 1985 (NRC, 1985, page 34). Several government-commissioned studies on fisheries development potential warned that, although exporting pollock to Japan was a great development opportunity available to the US fishing industry, Japanese tariff and nontariff import barriers, such as an import quota system, posed a great challenge for these development efforts (US Department of Commerce, 1978; 1983; see also ACIB, 1987; US House, 1980a; 1982b; 1987–88). The US government complained in particular about the administration and distribution of import quotas, claiming that entry into the system was difficult and that the process was neither open

<sup>(2)</sup>All trade statistics are calculated from NMFS (2000) and NMFS (annual).

nor transparent (US Department of Commerce, 1983, pages 465–466). US policy from the 1970s forward, including the fish and chips measures, was aimed largely at eliminating these barriers in order to open Japanese markets to US-processed fish. However, the policy had only limited successes at this, and the Japanese import quota system remained largely intact through the mid-1980s.

At the same time, though, US negotiators lost their leverage to gain concessions from the Japanese government and industry; increases in domestic fishing decreased the total level of foreign fishing, making the fish and chips policy essentially moot. US policymakers argued that they needed to change their strategy to make fish trade a part of the larger trade picture, addressed through multilateral forums such as GATT, rather than an aspect of fishing allocations (US House, 1987–88). Initiating this new policy strategy in 1986, the USA brought a legal case against Japan under the GATT framework, claiming that the Japanese import quota system on pollock and herring was an unfair barrier to free trade. At the end of a series of talks held from 1986 to 1987, Japan agreed to liberalize the import quota system so that US exporters could gain access to Japanese import quotas (US House, 1987–88). This agreement was “of great significance to the developing U.S. surimi industry” in particular (Snead, 1989, page 17), and by early 1988, US sales of surimi and herring to Japan had increased by US \$25 million (US House, 1987–88, page 164).

That the USA was successful in these talks reflects Japan’s changing situation as a fishing nation: by the late 1980s, the quota system was no longer necessary. As Japan’s largest fish firms invested heavily in the US pollock industry, it was in their interest to be able to import that fish into Japan without trade friction. Representatives of the Japanese industry themselves agreed to push for liberalization of the quota system (NRC, 1986, appendix 1; US House, 1987–88, page 103). The fish and chips policy, by encouraging joint ventures and FDI, changed the trade environment. Although the US government continues to approach trade as though it involves separate trading partners, trade in pollock is actually premised on the intricate interdependencies among US and Japanese firms in their efforts to gain access to fish, opportunity, and profits. Americanization of this regional fishery created new global configurations of economic integration as firms built and now participate in transnational production chains.

## Conclusions

Americanization of the North Pacific involved a transition from a Japanese domestic fishery carried out in international waters to a transnational industry carried out in US national waters. This transition does not represent a shift from one scale of interaction to another, but rather reflects the complexity of scalar relations involved in extended jurisdiction and the enclosure of marine territory as national space. In the process of extending jurisdiction over the coastal ocean, the USA enrolled a variety of actors in producing new scalar configurations of state power and transnational economic activity.

The North Pacific region has been reconstituted as simultaneously a space of the state, under full national control, and a space of a transnational fish industry, characterized by FDI and international trade and partnerships. There are no clear lines between what is a domestic industry and what is a transnational industry. The extent to which national state control and global integration are intertwined in this industry is still not acknowledged by US policymakers, who remain tied to the idea of an Americanized fishery, premised on being able to discern what is American from what is foreign. This is particularly evident in the 1998 American Fisheries Act, aimed primarily at the North Pacific pollock fishery, which continues the project of asserting

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control over the 200-mile zone by developing a fully 'domestic' industry (AFA, 1998). To remove foreign interests from the fishery, this legislation mandated an increase in minimum domestic ownership of vessels and transferred fishing rights from the at-sea processing fleet to the onshore processors by increasing the onshore portion of the total catch. However, by focusing on these particular measures, this act focuses entirely on fishing while ignoring the level of transnational integration in the rest of the industry, leading one critic to dub the act "the treaty between Norway and Japan" (*Pacific Fishing* 1998, page 30). In the rhetoric of Americanization, politicians are content to ignore that this industry is not in fact domestic, but is characterized by transnational forms of economic activity.

Extended jurisdiction and control over new territory fundamentally transformed the North Pacific, turning it into a region divided into national territories with separate domestic fisheries. Efforts at fishery development within the North Pacific should be seen as contributing to the active production not just of a regional fishing industry, but also of a variety of intertwined scales. Extending jurisdiction, enlisting the international community in acknowledging and accepting state control over marine territory, developing policy initiatives aimed at taking active control of the new territory, and involving international fishing interests in domestic fishery development were all processes that produced both the national state and globalization. Actively extending state control into ocean space produced and defined what the state is, particularly in the realm of ocean governance, but also in areas such as international relations and regional economic development policy. Efforts to extend state control into the oceans also actively produced globalization. Without state control, there would have been no need for any integration among the industries of the USA, Japan, Korea, and Norway. Enclosure of the North Pacific as national territory, and acceptance of this in the international community, allowed the USA to enlist the Japanese and other foreign fish industries in domestic fisheries development. The global forms of economic activity that characterize this industry, including investment and trade, are dependent upon, rather than a challenge to, state control and fishery development policy.

By examining the ways in which transformation of the pollock fishery produced intertwined regional, national, and global scalar configurations, I have tried to treat scale as processual and relational. In this view, the production of scale is ongoing and contested, rather than fixed or stable, as scales are both the outcome and premise of specific actions. By emphasizing a processual view of regional formations, state power, and global economic activity, I have highlighted some of the ways that states play a role in constituting and shaping globalization; yet I am not simply promoting a "state metageography" that encompasses globalization (see Taylor, 2000). I avoid the territorial trap of assuming the existence of a given state apparatus (Agnew, 1994) by analyzing particular scalar processes that produce state power. Although my argument runs parallel to the glocalization argument, discussed earlier, in terms of its emphasis on the continuing role of the state, my argument differs in that I show that the national also continues to be produced as a relevant scale. Glocalization theorists posit that, although contemporary scalar reconfiguration does not mark the erosion of the state, globalization is eroding the national scale. As Brenner states, "the globalists are indeed correct to emphasize the ongoing decentering of the national-scale of political-economic regulation.... Meanwhile, the statist are likewise correct to emphasize the continued importance of state territoriality but err in assuming that this role remains tied inextricably to national scale state institutions and policies" (1999b, pages 438–439). In the pollock industry, however, it is precisely the assertion of the ocean as national space, and the continuing emphasis on a national fish industry, that has led to a variety of new scalar relations. Although state territoriality is certainly not

tied inextricably to the national scale, in the North Pacific it appears that the nationally scaled state has become stronger at the same time that globalization is increasing, and that these are in fact connected rather than contradictory.

Analyzing globalization as a process of scalar production offers the possibility of “thinking globalization as many, as other to itself, as inscribing different development paths and economic identities” (Gibson-Graham, 1996, page 146). To do this, it is important to present the production of scale as the outcome of the practices of real actors: globalization itself is not the agent of change. Highlighting the ways in which particular actors have produced scales in specific contexts allows for an analysis of scale that refuses to fall back on generic stories of scalar transformations and scalar fixes required for universal processes of capital accumulation. Because the relationships between actors will be different depending on the situation, scalar relationships will themselves be different, and it becomes important to investigate empirically a variety of situations to learn about the causes of variability, rather than applying a single model of state–economy relations. By challenging the idea that one system (global/local accumulation and regulation) is simply replacing another system (the nation-state with a corresponding national economy), this analysis highlights the importance of looking at heterogeneous scalar processes.

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